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 Summary 
In its recent report, the Governor’s Committee on Education Excellence proposes a major 
restructuring of California’s school finance system.1   It would replace most of the myriad 
separate programs through which revenue now flows from the state to local school districts 
with two simple programs:  a base program and a targeted program.  The base program would 
serve the educational needs of all students.  The targeted program would provide supplemental 
funds for disadvantaged students.  Base revenue would be allocated according to the total 
number of students in each district.  Targeted revenue would be allocated according to the 
number of English learners and students from low-income families.  The Committee would not 
restrict the use of funds in these two programs, although districts would be obliged to 
demonstrate that targeted funds enhance the education of disadvantaged students.  The 
Committee’s proposed reform would not affect some current revenue programs, the most 
notable of which is special education.  Overall, however, 86 percent of state revenue allocated to 
public schools would be consolidated into the new base and targeted programs.  
The Committee is not specific about every detail of its proposed new school finance 
system, including the level of base funding.  It does stipulate, however, that targeted revenue 
for each low-income student should be 40 percent of revenue per student in its base program 
and that targeted revenue for each English learner be 20 percent of that base revenue per 
student.  It also suggests that base revenue vary with the grade attended by students, using the 
current funding formula for charter schools as a model.   
Using those parameters, we have simulated the Committee’s proposal.  Our simulations 
compare the revenue school districts would have received under various versions of the 
Committee’s proposed system with the revenue districts actually received in 2004-2005 from the 
programs the Committee would eliminate.  In conducting these simulations, we have imposed 
the condition that no district receives less revenue under the proposed system than it actually 
received in 2004-2005.   
Each simulation starts by assuming a level of base revenue in grades 4 through 6.  From 
that foundation, base revenue in other grades is derived, which then determines targeted 
revenue for low-income students and English learners.  Table S.1 shows the additional revenue 
required by the Committee’s proposal for three different assumptions about base revenue for 
grades 4 through 6.  If base revenue for grades 4 through 6 is $5,530 per student, the 
Committee’s proposed finance system would require revenue of approximately $41 billion, a 
$4.5 billion increase over the revenue allocated in 2004-2005 through the programs the 
Committee would consolidate.  Adjusting for inflation between 2004-2005 and 2007-2008, this 
additional revenue is approximately $5 billion, which is the Committee’s estimate of the cost of 
its proposal.  Thus, we believe that our simulation with the assumed value of $5,530 per student 
for base revenue in grades 4 through 6 best represents the Committee’s proposal.   
                                                     
1 Governor’s Committee on Education Excellence, “Students First:  Renewing Hope for California’s 
Future,” November 2007. 
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 Table S.1 
Additional Revenue Required for Finance Proposal of Governor’s Committee  
(2004-2005 dollars) 
Base Revenue for
Grades 4 - 6
($/student)
5,000 9 2,374 2,384
5,530 1,697 2,798 4,495
6,000 4,601 3,175 7,776
Base Targeted Total
($ M) ($ M) ($ M)
Revenue Revenue Revenue
 
 
Most of the additional revenue required by that proposal would be allocated to the new 
targeted program.  Of the $4.5 billion in additional revenue, roughly 60 percent would be 
allocated to that program.  In contrast, of the $36 billion in revenue in all the programs that the 
Governor’s Committee would eliminate, only 5 percent of the total was allocated through 
targeted programs.  Relative to the status quo, the Committee would place a much higher 
priority on providing additional resources for disadvantaged students.   
This priority is clearly reflected in the revenue gains districts would experience with the 
Committee’s proposal.  Districts with high percentages of low-income students would receive 
the largest gains (Table S.2).  For example, among unified districts with more than 10,000 
students, districts with fewer than 10 percent of students living in families below the federal 
poverty threshold have an average gain of $698 per student.  In comparison, districts with more 
than 20 percent low-income students have an average gain of $1,071 per student.  The same 
general pattern holds for unified districts of smaller size and for elementary and high school 
districts.  Among districts of the same type and similar size, the average gain in revenue is 
larger for high-poverty districts than for low-poverty districts. 
Table S.2 
Average Increase in Revenue with Base Revenue for Grades 4 – 6 of  $5,530 per Student 
(2004-2005 dollars per student) 
Elementary Districts
Small (0 - 250 students) 228 324 781
Medium (250 - 1,500 students) 322 487 1,163
Large (1,500 + students) 509 851 1,249
High School Districts
Small (0 - 1,500 students) 180 355 797
Medium (1,500 - 6,000 students) 323 542 921
Large (6,000 + students) 362 700 637
Unified Districts
Small (0 - 3,000 students) 406 472 868
Medium (3,000 - 10,000 students) 595 759 1,215
Large (10,000 + students) 698 906 1,071
0 - 10 10 - 20 20 or more
Percent of Low-income Students*
 
*Low-income students are students living in families with income below the federal poverty 
threshold. 
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 Other patterns are apparent in the distribution of gains.  Large districts gain more than 
small districts, a reflection of the current allocation of revenue.  Currently, revenue per pupil 
tends to be greater for small districts than for large districts.  Accordingly, small districts gain 
less from the Committee’s proposal.  Similarly, because high school districts tend to have more 
revenue per pupil under the current system than elementary and unified districts, high school 
districts would have smaller gains on average under the Committee’s proposal.   
The finance proposal of the Governor’s Committee is quite similar to another recent 
proposal by Alan Bersin, Michael Kirst, and Goodwin Liu.2  Like the Governor’s Committee, 
Bersin, Kirst, and Liu would consolidate a large number of current revenue programs into two 
programs:  a base program and a targeted program.  The two proposals differ in four areas, 
however.  While Bersin, Kirst, and Liu recognize that it may be desirable to weight grade levels 
differently in allocating base revenue, they do not make an explicit recommendation about 
those weights.  A second difference concerns the definition of disadvantaged students.  Like the 
Governor’s Committee, Bersin, Kirst and Liu define targeted students as English learners and 
students from low-income families.  They would use a different measure of low-income 
families, however, and apply different weights for low-income students and English learners.  
They would also provide additional funds to districts with high concentrations of 
disadvantaged students, a third main difference between the two proposals.  The Governor’s 
Committee considered a concentration factor for its funding formula, but did not recommend it.  
Lastly, Bersin, Kirst, and Liu propose to adjust school district revenue for differences in regional 
labor market conditions, another adjustment the Governor’s Committee considered but did not 
recommend.   
These differences illustrate that there are significant policy choices in implementing the 
direction of reform that both the Governor’s Committee and Bersin, Kirst, and Liu have chosen.  
Those choices are far less significant, however, than the fundamental decisions the state would 
have to make in adopting either proposal.  The first decision concerns the devolution of fiscal 
authority to local school districts.  Both proposals would eliminate dozens of revenue programs, 
most of which have restrictions on how funds can be used.  By eliminating those programs, the 
state would also lose its control over the use of revenue, delegating that authority to local school 
districts.  The second important decision concerns the priority both proposals place on targeting 
new revenue to districts with high proportions of disadvantaged students.  Overall, school 
districts in California have fewer resources than districts in many other states, yet the state has 
set very high standards for its schools.  Can the state allocate a high proportion of additional 
funds to high poverty districts when all districts in the state may reasonably believe that their 
resources are inadequate for the job the state has asked them to do? 
 
 
    
                                                     
2 Bersin, Alan, Michael W. Kirst, and Goodwin Liu, “Getting Beyond the Facts:  Reforming California 
School Finance,” Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity, and Diversity, University of 
California, Berkeley, California, 2007. 
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 Introduction 
In introducing his Committee on Education Excellence, Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger acknowledged the many excellent public school teachers in California but 
declared that “they work in a system that is broken.”  He charged his Committee with helping 
him to repair this system and “to make California’s schools the best in the nation once again.”3  
Judging by its recently released report, “Students First:  Renewing Hope for California’s 
Future,” the Committee has done its part.  It has made fundamental and coherent 
recommendations in a wide range of areas, laying out an ambitious agenda that promises to 
transform California’s public schools. 
While the Committee warns against picking and choosing among its recommendations, 
we believe its proposed reform of California’s school finance system is particularly important. 
Based on its research review, the Committee concluded that “California’s educational finance 
system is the most complex in the nation, but yields little benefits” (page 21).  In its view, the 
system is inequitable, inefficient, and “not sufficient for students who face the greatest 
challenges” (page 23).  
The Committee would dramatically simplify that system and allocate substantially more 
revenue to school districts with many disadvantaged students.  In particular, it would 
consolidate a large number of complex revenue programs into two simple programs:  a base 
program and a targeted program.  The base program would serve the educational needs of all 
students.  The targeted program would provide supplemental funds for disadvantaged 
students who are likely to need additional assistance.  Base revenue would be allocated to 
districts in proportion to average daily attendance (ADA), with different weights for students in 
different grades.  Targeted revenue would be allocated according to the number of English 
learners and students from low-income families.  For each low-income student, districts would 
receive targeted funds equal to 40 percent of base funding per pupil.  For each English learner, 
districts would receive targeted funds equal to 20 percent of base funding per pupil.  This rate 
would be lower for students classified as English learners for more than three years.  The 
Committee would not restrict the use of funds in these two programs, although school districts 
would be obliged to demonstrate that targeted funds enhance the education of disadvantaged 
students. It would exclude some programs from consolidation, the most significant of which is 
special education.  Overall, however, 86 percent of state revenue allocated to public schools 
would be consolidated into the new base and targeted programs. 
In this paper, we use the PPIC school finance simulation model to analyze the 
Committee’s proposal.  The model compares the revenue each school district received in 2004-
2005 with the revenue it would have received if an alternative formula had been used to allocate 
revenue.  Because the Committee is not specific about every detail of its proposed system, we 
must assume the values of certain parameters in those simulations.  As a consequence, our 
results ought to be regarded as illustrative of the general concepts proposed by the Governor’s 
Committee, rather than a definitive analysis of its proposed system. 
                                                     
3 Press release, Office of the Governor of California, April 8, 2005, GAAS:124:05. 
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 Policy Choices 
The finance reform proposed by the Governor’s Committee on Education Excellence 
(GCEE) is similar to a recent proposal by Alan Bersin, Michael Kirst, and Goodwin Liu (2007), 
which we analyzed in “Funding Formulas for California Public Schools:  Simulations and 
Supporting Data.”  Both share the same underlying philosophy:  simplify the system and direct 
more resources to disadvantaged students.  As in the GCEE proposal, the Bersin-Kirst-Liu 
(BKL) proposal would also consolidate most current revenue programs into base and targeted 
programs.  Also as in the GCEE proposal, base revenue would be allocated according to the 
number of students, and targeted revenue would be allocated according to the number of low-
income students and English learners.   
While the two proposals share the same core philosophy, they do differ in four areas.  
These differences illustrate important policy choices that the state would face in implementing 
this philosophy.  The remainder of the section discusses these differences.  By this discussion, 
we do not intend to pit one proposal against another.  Instead, our intention is to draw out some 
of the details of both proposals, providing a foundation for the simulations that follow.  The 
reality is that, despite some differences, both proposals are quite similar to each other and also 
quite different from the status quo. 
The following discussion often refers to evidence presented in our paper “Funding 
Formulas for California Schools: Simulations and Supporting Data” or in the supporting 
document, “Funding Formulas for California Schools:  Further Analysis,” which is available on 
the PPIC website.  In what follows, we refer to the paper as Funding Formulas and to the web 
document as Further Analysis. 
Grade Level 
The base program allocates revenue in proportion to the number of students in a district.  
In counting students for this purpose, the Governor’s Committee recommends different weights 
for students in different grades.  It further recommends that these weights be “structured in a 
manner similar to the revenue limit funding structure already employed in California for 
charter schools.”4  Table 1 displays the general purpose entitlement rates for charter schools in 
2004-2005.  For example, for every student in grades K through 3, a charter school received 
$4,724 in general purpose funding.  Because charter schools are also eligible for revenue from 
the K-3 class size reduction program, as a practical matter the base funding for students in 
grades K through 3 was the general purpose entitlement rate plus the $928 per pupil a school 
would have received for maintaining class sizes of 20 or fewer students.  Column 3 of the table 
shows the funding per pupil with both the general purpose rate and class size reduction funds.  
The fourth column turns these funding levels into weights, using the funding level for grades 4 
through 6 as a base.   For example, the implicit weight for high school students is 1.2, implying 
that districts would receive 20 percent more revenue for every high school student than for a 
student in grades 4 though 6.   
                                                     
4 Governor’s Committee Technical Report, page 5-19. 
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Table 1 
Grade Level Weights in Charter School Funding Model, 2004-2005 
Grade Span
K - 3 4,724 928 5,652 1.18
4 - 6 4,793 0 4,793 1.00
7 - 8 4,934 0 4,934 1.03
9 - 12 5,732 0 5,732 1.20
Entitlement
Purpose
General 
($/pupil) ($/pupil)
ImplicitTotal
K - 3
Class Size
Reduction
Weights($/pupil)
 
 
Bersin, Kirst, and Liu also mention the possibility of weighting student counts by grade 
level.  However, they characterize the choice of weights as a judgment best left to policy makers 
and do not recommend specific weights themselves.  In fact, policy judgments vary 
considerably across states.  Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Wyoming give 
higher weights to high school students than to other students.  Another five states (Arizona, 
Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Vermont) give higher weights to middle and high school 
students than to elementary students.  And five states (Alabama, Minnesota, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, and South Carolina) distinguish between grades K through 3 and grades 4 through 
6, giving higher weight to the earlier grades.  Nine states treat all grades uniformly.5 
Disadvantaged Students 
Both proposals would allocate targeted revenue according to the number of students 
from low-income families, families with income below a certain threshold.  The thresholds 
differ between the two proposals, however.  Under the GCEE proposal, low-income students 
are those living in families with income below the federal poverty guidelines.  In 2007, the 
federal poverty guideline for a family of four was $20,650.  Under the BKL proposal, low-
income students are those who qualify for free or reduced-price lunch.  A student qualifies for 
free or reduced-price lunch if his or her family’s income is less than 185 percent of the federal 
poverty guidelines.  For a family of four, this threshold was $38,203 in 2007.  Because it has a 
higher income threshold, the BKL definition of poverty casts a wider net.  Every student who is 
low-income under the GCEE definition is also low-income under the BKL definition, but many 
more students would be classified as low-income under the BKL definition.  Nevertheless, even 
the higher income threshold is far below median family income.  In 2006, the median income for 
a family of four living in California was $74,801, more than twice as high as the threshold for 
reduced-price lunch.6 
Though the two definitions of poverty are closely related, they imply entirely different 
methods for determining the number of low-income students.  The BKL measure of poverty is 
                                                     
5 We thank Jennifer Imazeki for this summary of grade-level weights in different states. 
6 The estimate of median family income in 2006 is from the American Community Survey of the U.S. 
Census Bureau, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/statemedfaminc.html. 
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 simply the number of students in a district who participate in a district’s free or reduced-price 
lunch program.  For its children to participate, a family must apply for the program, certifying 
that its annual income satisfies the eligibility criteria.  The BKL measure of poverty thus 
depends upon the participation rate of qualified families.  On the other hand, the GCEE 
measure of poverty starts with the decennial census.  For the census years, the U.S. Census 
Bureau estimates for each school district the percentage of children ages 5 through 17 living in 
households with income below the federal poverty guideline.  It then updates this statistic 
annually to use in distributing federal aid.  While this measure of student poverty does not 
depend on participation rates, the annual updates are estimates that may not capture unique 
trends in individual school districts.7 
The two measures are compared in Funding Formulas.  On average across districts, the 
GCEE measure, the percentage of children in a district living in families with income below the 
federal poverty guidelines, is approximately one-third of the BKL measure, the percentage of 
students participating in the district’s free or reduced-price lunch program.  The relationship 
between the two measures is displayed in Figure 1 for unified districts in 2004-2005.  The points 
in the figure represent values of the two measures for those districts, and the bold line is the 
average value of the GCEE measure for various values of the BKL measure.8  According to that 
relationship, when the BKL measure is 20 percent, the average value of the GCEE measure is 8 
percent.  When the BKL measure is 100 percent, the average GCEE measure is 32 percent.   
Similar relationships hold for elementary and high school districts.  The data for these districts 
is displayed in Figure 7 of Further Analysis. 
                                                     
7 The estimates are based on countywide poverty estimates and federal income tax returns from 
taxpayers within a district’s boundaries. 
8 By average value, we mean the value from an  ordinary least squares regression of the percent living in 
poverty on the percent in free or reduced-price lunch.  The y-intercept for that regression is 2.5 
percentage points and the slope is 0.29. 
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 Figure 1 
Percent Living in Poverty and Percent Free or Reduced-Price Lunch 
Unified Districts, 2004-2005 
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The close relationship between the two measures has an important implication for 
school finance formulas:  Either measure will give approximately the same percentage of 
targeted revenue to each district.  For example, if a district would receive 5 percent of targeted 
revenue with the BKL measure of poverty used to allocate that revenue, it would receive 
approximately 5 percent with the GCEE measure.  Furthermore, if revenue per targeted student 
is adjusted so that the total amount of targeted revenue allocated throughout the state is the 
same, the allocation of revenue to each district will be approximately the same.  For example, 
under the GCEE proposal, districts would receive 40 percent of base funding per pupil for each 
low-income student, using the federal poverty guidelines to determine poverty status.  The 
allocation of targeted revenue would be about the same if each district received 13 percent (0.33 
x 40 percent) of base funding per pupil for each student qualifying for free or reduced-price 
lunch.   
Although the two definitions of poverty may not imply significant differences in the 
relative distribution of revenue, the ways in which the two proposals incorporate English 
learners do imply significant differences.  Compared to the BKL proposal, the GCEE proposal 
would allocate more revenue to districts in which disadvantaged students are both low-income 
and English learners than to districts in which disadvantaged students are low-income but 
fluent in English.  These distinctions are important because most English learners are also low-
income students.  Using participation in free or reduced-price lunch to define poverty, 85 
percent of English learners are also low-income students.  However, the majority of low-income 
students are not English learners.   Considering the universe of students who are English 
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 learners or poor, roughly 37 percent of students are both poor and English learners, 57 percent 
are poor students who are not English learners, and about 6 percent are English learners who 
are not poor.  Under the BKL proposal, districts would receive the same amount of additional 
revenue for students in each of the three groups.  Under the GCEE proposal, districts would 
receive additional revenue of 60 percent of base funding for a student who is both poor and an 
English learner, 40 percent for a student who is poor and fluent in English, and 20 percent for a 
student who is an English learner but not poor.   
The GCEE approach to incorporating English learners is generally consistent with the 
performance of students from each group on statewide achievement tests.  English learners who 
are also economically disadvantaged score lower on statewide achievement tests than students 
who are economically disadvantaged but fluent in English.  The percentages of students who 
score in the proficient or advanced range in English and math are displayed in Table 2.  These 
percentages, or proficiency rates, are derived from student-level data, a necessary requirement 
for sorting students into the three groups described above.9  The partition of students by 
income is based on the criterion of economic disadvantage used by the California Departm
of Education in reporting test results.  Students are economically disadvantaged if they 
participate in the free or reduced-price lunch program or if neither of their parents is a h
school graduate.  In the English-Language Arts CST (California Standards Test), students wh
are economically disadvantaged and also English learners (column 1) have much lower 
proficiency rates than students in either of the other three groups represented in the table.  In
particular, they have lower proficiency rates than students who are economically 
disadvantaged, but fluent in English (column 2).  The same pattern holds for the Mathematics 
CST.  Note also that students who are English learners but not economically disadvantaged 
(column 3) have higher proficiency rates than students who are English learners and 
ent 
igh 
o 
 
disadvantaged (column 1). 
                                                     
9 Student-level test data were obtained through a special request to the Standards and Assessment 
Division of the California Department of Education.  To protect student identities, these data did not 
include student records for which five or fewer students in a school belonged to a specific category.   
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Table 2 
Percentage of Students Proficient on California Standards Tests by  
Grade, Economic Status, and English Fluency, 2007 
EL Not EL EL Not EL
English-Language Arts
Grade 2 27 44 51 70
Grade 3 13 33 30 61
Grade 4 22 49 40 76
Grade 5 13 42 26 69
Grade 6 8 38 19 65
Mathematics
Grade 2 43 54 63 77
Grade 3 40 54 58 76
Grade 4 38 54 53 75
Grade 5 24 46 38 68
Grade 6 13 37 26 62
Disadvantaged* Not Disadvantaged
 
*”Disadvantaged” signifies students who are economically disadvantaged 
according to the definition of the California Department of Education.   “EL” 
signifies English learner. 
 
Proficiency rates are not direct measures of resource needs, of course.  An English 
learner who is not proficient in English or mathematics may require a different intervention 
than a struggling student who is economically disadvantaged but fluent in English.  Different 
interventions may require different resources and thus have different costs.  After reviewing the 
existing research on the costs of educating English learners, Gàndara and Rumberger (2006) 
concluded that the research is inconclusive on the question of whether the cost of educating 
English learners is higher or lower than the cost of educating economically disadvantaged 
students who are fluent in English.  In a subsequent paper, Gàndara, Maxwell-Jolly, and 
Rumberger (2008) extend the policy recommendations in the previous paper, an extension 
resulting from “deliberations from several informal meetings and two formal convenings of 
major stakeholders in the area of English Learner (EL) education”(page 1).  Armed with the 
views of EL stakeholders, Gàndara and her co-authors “concur with the Governor’s Committee 
on Education Excellence that an initial additional 20 percent above and beyond the weight for 
poor students be assigned to EL students . . .”(page 8). 
Concentration Factors 
In addition to the different definitions of disadvantaged students, the two proposals 
differ in the emphasis they place on districts with high percentages of such students.  Under the 
GCEE proposal, the revenue per disadvantaged student does not change as the percentage of 
those students increases.  However, it does change in the BKL proposal.  Once the percentage 
reaches 50, the amount per disadvantaged student increases proportionally with the percentage 
of disadvantaged students.  When all students are disadvantaged, the revenue per 
disadvantaged student is twice as high as when 50 percent or fewer of students are 
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 disadvantaged.  Figure 2 demonstrates an example of this concentration factor.  The bold line in 
the figure represents a district’s targeted revenue per disadvantaged student as the percentage 
of disadvantaged students increases.  When the percent of disadvantaged students is less than 
50, targeted revenue is $1,000 per disadvantaged student.  As the percentage increases, that rate 
increases.  When the percentage is 75, targeted revenue is $1,500 per disadvantaged student.  At 
100 percent, it is $2,000 per disadvantaged student. 
 
Figure 2 
An Illustration of the BKL Concentration Factor 
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The rationale for a concentration factor is that a disadvantaged student is more likely to 
need additional help in schools in which many other students are also disadvantaged.  To make 
this idea concrete, let us present a simple example that connects disadvantaged students with 
the need for additional resources.  Imagine a school with a general education program 
involving regular classroom work and homework.  For some students, this routine is sufficient 
to master the academic content specified by the state.  It is sufficient for them to attain 
proficiency as measured by statewide tests.  For others, the routine is not sufficient and 
additional help is necessary to attain proficiency.  This intervention is an after-school program 
that combines nutrition, play, and tutoring.  On average, the percentage of disadvantaged 
students who do not attain proficiency with the regular routine is greater than the percentage of 
other students who do not attain proficiency.  Because of this difference, schools with high 
percentages of disadvantaged students need additional resources to operate their intervention 
program.  The targeted program provides the funds for these additional resources.   
9 
 The question is whether the percentage of disadvantaged students attaining proficiency 
falls as the percentage of disadvantaged students in a school rises.  If it does, there is a rationale 
for a concentration factor.  We explored that question in Funding Formula and provide 
additional evidence in Further Analysis.  Regardless of the subject tested (English Language Arts 
or Mathematics) or the grade level (elementary, middle, or high school), the percentage of 
disadvantaged students who are proficient declines with the percentage of students who are 
disadvantaged.  Figure 3 provides a representative example for the 2007 English Language Arts 
CST for elementary schools.  The points in the figure represent proficiency rates and 
disadvantage percentages for these schools.  The bold line in the figure is the average 
relationship between the proficiency rate of disadvantaged students and the percent who are 
disadvantaged.10  Figure 6 of Further Analysis presents equivalent figures for the mathematics 
CST and for middle and high schools in both English and mathematics.  In all cases, there is a 
clear negative relationship between the two variables.   
Figure 3 
Proficiency of Disadvantaged Students and Percent Disadvantaged 
English Language Arts CTS, Elementary Schools, 2007 
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While this negative relationship tends to support the use of a concentration factor in a 
funding formula, it is important to keep in mind that California’s school finance system 
operates at the district level, not the school level.  A district may have relatively few 
10 By the average relationship, we mean the ordinary least squares regression of the percent proficient on 
the percent economically disadvantaged.  A student is economically disadvantaged if he or she 
participates in the school’s subsidized lunch program or if neither parent is a high school graduate.  The 
y-intercept of the average relationship is 50.6 percentage points, and the slope is -0.24. 
10 
 disadvantaged students, but still have some schools with a high concentration of disadvantaged 
students.  School-level concentration will not necessarily be identified through district-level 
data. 
Regional Wage Adjustments 
The targeted programs in both the BKL and GCEE proposals reflect the reality that 
schools with many disadvantaged students may need additional resources.  The targeted 
program would provide districts with the revenue necessary to employ those additional 
resources.  The cost of resources, particularly personnel,  may also vary from district to district 
implying that districts with similar resource needs may require different levels of revenue.  The 
BKL proposal would account for this possibility by adjusting the revenue in its base and 
targeted programs for regional wage differences.  The Governor’s Committee considered a 
regional wage adjustment, but did not recommend it. 
The rationale for regional wage adjustments is that school districts must compete with 
other employers for qualified workers and that labor market conditions differ across regions.  In 
particular, the wage an employer must offer to attract qualified employees will depend on what 
other employers in its region are offering.  These offers, in turn, depend on a number of regional 
factors including housing prices and regional amenities.  More generally, the competitive wage 
in a region is the wage that will make employees content to live and work in that region instead 
of alternative regions.  Because local amenities and housing prices affect the welfare of workers, 
the competitive wage incorporates these other factors.  The difference in competitive wages for 
non-teachers across the state should act as a guide for the differences in teacher costs across the 
state. 
In Funding Formulas, we demonstrated considerable variation across California regions 
in the average wages of college-educated workers who are not teachers, the segment of the 
labor market in which school districts must compete for teachers and administrators.  We also 
showed that the compensation of public school teachers is positively correlated with the 
average wage of college-educated workers in their region.  However, the revenue of California 
school districts does not reflect these regional wage differences, and thus districts in relatively 
high-wage regions employ fewer teachers per student than their counterparts in low-wage 
regions.   
This relationship between regional wage differences and students per teacher is depicted 
in Figure 4.  The regions are based on the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) designations of 
the U.S. Census Bureau.  An MSA is a county or group of counties containing a significant 
urban area.  Thirty-four of California’s 58 counties are in one of these MSAs.  The remaining 24 
counties are grouped into 5 regions.  The 25 MSAs plus the 5 regions constitute the 30 regions 
represented in the figure.  The figure shows a wage index for each region and the ratio of 
students per teacher in the region.11  The bold line in the figure represents the average 
                                                     
11 The index is based on the average wage of college-educated workers not employed in public schools.  It 
is the average wage for a region divided by the average wage for the state.  The derivation of the index is 
described in Rose and Sengupta (2007). 
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 relationship between the wage index and the student-teacher ratio.12  According to this 
relationship, a region with an index of 0.8 will have a student-teacher ratio of 20, and a region 
with an index of 1.2 will have a ratio of 21.5, a difference of 7.5 percent.  
Figure 4 
Students per Teacher and Regional Wage Index 
California Regions, 2003-2004 
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The figure also reveals a few regions not well-represented by this average relationship.  
The San Francisco MSA, consisting of San Francisco, Marin, and San Mateo Counties, has a 
wage index of 1.14 and a student-teacher ratio of 19.2.  In comparison, Orange County has an 
index of 1.06 and a student-teacher ratio of 23.0.  Other factors are clearly at work in 
determining student-teacher ratios.  For example, many districts in Marin and San Mateo 
Counties have “excess taxes,” property tax revenue in excess of the state’s revenue limit for a 
district.  Districts in that fortunate circumstance have more revenue than other districts, 
allowing them to employ relatively more teachers.  In an attempt to sort out the contribution of 
these various factors, Rose and Sengupta (2007) used a statistical model to estimate a district’s 
student-teacher ratio as a function of its revenue per student, its regional wage index, and a 
number of other factors.  They found that, holding other factors including revenue per student 
                                                     
12 By average relationship, we mean an ordinary least squares regression of the student-teacher ratio of a 
region on its wage index.  The y-intercept of that relationship is 16.8 students per teacher, and the slope is 
3.9. 
12 
 constant, a 10 percent increase in a district’s regional wage index increases its student-teacher 
ratio by 2 percent, a response that is significantly greater than that depicted by the average 
relationship in Figure 4.  For the same increase in the wage index, the ratio of students to other 
certified employees rises by about 6 percent.  
While this statistical evidence provides a rationale for incorporating a regional wage 
index in the state’s funding formula, a number of practical issues argue against including such 
an index.  To us, the most compelling is simplicity, a clearly stated priority of the Governor’s 
Committee.  Adjusting for regional wage differences is not complicated by itself, but it does beg 
the question of what other cost differences ought to be incorporated in the state’s funding 
formula.  Because school districts operate in such a wide variety of circumstances, adjusting 
revenue for cost differences could quickly degenerate into a series of special cases.  We 
considered some of these possible adjustments in Funding Formulas.  In particular, we 
considered differences across districts in utility and transportation costs, two other sources of 
cost differences frequently identified.  We found that differences in labor costs across districts 
are far more important than differences in utility or transportation costs, suggesting that if the 
state incorporates any cost adjustments in its funding formulas it should start with an 
adjustment for differences in regional labor markets. 
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 Simulations 
The previous section concerned four areas in which the GCEE and BKL proposals differ.  
Those differences are minor, however, compared to the similarities between the two.  Both 
would greatly simplify California’s school finance system and direct significantly more 
resources to disadvantaged students.  The important contrast is not between the two proposals 
but between either and the status quo.  Accordingly, this section focuses on that contrast by 
comparing the revenue districts would receive under the GCEE proposal with the revenue they 
receive under the current system.  Funding Formulas provides a similar analysis for the BKL 
proposal and a full description of the PPIC school finance simulation model, which is used in 
both simulations. 
Baseline 
The Governor’s Committee would allocate revenue among school districts according to 
a simple formula, base revenue in proportion to the total number of students and targeted 
revenue in proportion to the number of low-income students and English learners.  Because that 
formula is so transparent, understanding how it would change the allocation of revenue is 
largely a matter of understanding how revenue is currently allocated through the programs the 
Committee would consolidate.  This section takes up that task, first for the programs that would 
be consolidated into the GCEE base program and then for the programs that would be 
consolidated into the GCEE targeted program.  Our analysis employs revenue data for 2004-
2005, the data underlying the PPIC model. 
The GCEE proposal would consolidate a large number of revenue programs into its base 
program.13  By our count, this consolidation would involve 45 of the revenue programs existing 
in 2004-2005.  These programs are listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix.  The largest are revenue 
limit funds, class size reduction, lottery revenue, home-to-school transportation, the school 
improvement program, and instructional materials.  In 2004-2005, revenue in all programs 
consolidated into the GCEE base program averaged  $5,958 per ADA.  Revenue limit funds 
amounted to 84 percent of that total.  The 45 programs consolidated into the new base program 
constitute 82 percent of state revenue allocated to public schools in 2004-2005.14 
Base revenue per ADA varied considerably among districts.  Thirty percent had base 
revenue at least $500 per ADA greater than the statewide average.  However, most high-
revenue districts are small.  In Table 3, districts of each type (elementary, high school, and 
unified) are partitioned into three groups according to size.  For each type, the average revenue 
per ADA is largest for the small districts.  Average revenue per ADA is $7,896 for unified 
districts with fewer than 3,000 ADA, $5,901 for unified districts with ADA between 3,000 and 
10,000, and $5,824 for unified districts with more than 10,000 ADA.  The dispersion of revenue 
is also greatest for small districts.  Only 16 percent of small unified districts had revenue within 
$500 per ADA of the average for that group of districts.  On the other hand, 95 percent of large 
unified districts had revenue per pupil within that range.  
                                                     
13 The programs are specified in Appendix D of the Committee’s Technical Report. 
14 In this case, “state revenue” includes all revenue limits funds, including property taxes.   
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 Table 3 
Revenue in Programs Consolidated into GCEE Base Program, 2004-2005 
Elementary districts
   Small (0 - 250 ADA) 197 8,759 9 17
   Medium (250 - 1,500 ADA) 180 6,190 78 93
   Large (1,500 ADA +) 180 5,834 93 98
High school districts
   Small (0 - 1,500 ADA) 27 7,982 15 41
   Medium (1,500 - 6,000 ADA) 27 6,724 74 85
   Large (6,000 ADA +) 29 6,518 93 93
Unified districts
   Small (0 - 3,000 ADA) 123 7,896 16 28
   Medium (3,000 - 10,000 ADA) 104 5,901 97 99
   Large (10,000 ADA +) 107 5,824 95 100
Percent of 
Districts Within 
$500 of Average
Percent of 
Districts Within 
$1,000 of Average
Average 
Revenue per 
ADA
Number of 
Districts
 
 
Base revenue also varies by district type.  For large districts, average revenue per ADA is 
approximately equal for elementary and unified districts, $5,834 and $5,824 respectively.  
However, average revenue per ADA is nearly $700 higher for large high school districts.  A 
similar pattern holds for medium-sized districts. 
The important question is whether these patterns in the distribution of base revenue 
reflect differences in district needs and costs not recognized in the GCEE proposal.  In 
addressing that question, we focus on the distribution of revenue limit funds because they 
constitute the bulk of base revenue.  That revenue source dates back to the 1971 ruling of the 
California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest.15  Before that time, school districts financed their 
activities by levying local property taxes.  This local revenue was supplemented by state aid.  In 
Serrano, the Court found this system unconstitutional because differences in property wealth 
among districts led to differences in revenue.  As the legislature began to fashion a response to 
this ruling, California voters weighed in with the passage of Proposition 13.  The initiative 
limited the property tax rate and gave the legislature the authority to allocate property tax 
revenue among local governments.  The legislature used this authority to craft a response to the 
Serrano ruling.  It assigned to each school district a portion of the tax revenue from properties 
located within its boundaries and then supplemented that local revenue with state aid so that 
total revenue equaled an amount referred to as the district’s revenue limit.  These limits were 
set by state statute, giving the state the authority to equalize district funding over time.  The 
manner in which the legislature has used this authority is the key to understanding current 
variations in revenue limit funding. 
When the revenue limit system was established, each district was assigned a base 
revenue limit, which was its general purpose revenue per ADA from state and local sources in 
1972-73.  The state has updated those base limits over the years.  In any particular year, a 
district’s revenue limit is its base revenue limit for that year multiplied by its ADA.  The state 
                                                     
15 For an account of these events, see Sonstelie, Brunner, and Ardon (2000). 
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 has taken steps to equalize these base limits, partly to satisfy the courts.  In general, these 
equalizations raise the base limits of districts with relatively low limits.  For this purpose, each 
district is placed in one of six groups defined by type (elementary, high school, and unified) and 
size (small and large).16  Equalization occurs within groups, but not across them.  Initially, small 
districts of each type tended to have higher revenue limits than large districts of the same type.  
Equalization within size grouping preserved that difference.  Similarly, high school districts 
tended to have higher revenue limits than other districts, a difference that has also persisted. 
Base revenue limits differ for a variety of other reasons.  In the 1980s, the state provided 
districts with incentives to lengthen the school day and year and increase the pay of beginning 
teachers.  Those incentives were eventually rolled into base limits.  When the state discontinued 
the practice of counting excused absences in average daily attendance, it adjusted revenue limits 
to offset the negative effect of this change on districts that had high rates of excused absences.  
A further adjustment was created when, in the wake of Proposition 13, the state discontinued 
most summer school programs and curtailed adult education.  Districts were permitted to add 
the revenue lost from these reductions to their revenue limits even though the programs were 
discontinued (Goldfinger, 1999). 
Another wedge between base revenue limits and revenue limit funding is excess taxes.  
When the property tax revenue assigned to districts exceeds their revenue limits, districts are 
allowed to keep these excess taxes.  The number of these “excess tax” districts varies from year 
to year as property tax revenue varies.  In 2004-2005, there were 74 of these districts.   
This account of variations in revenue limit funding is not meant to be exhaustive.  Its 
purpose is rather to suggest that many variations in revenue limit funding do not appear to be 
related to differences in district costs.  One obvious exception is the alternative to the revenue 
limit formula used to determine funding for necessary small schools.  Another possible 
exception is the partition of districts into groups by type and size, and the equalization of base 
limits within those groups.  Does that partition and the average revenue limit in each group 
represent a true difference in cost between districts in different groups?  We do not know the 
answer to that question, though it does seem odd that unified and elementary districts have 
approximately the same average revenue limits while high school districts have higher 
averages.  If high schools are more expensive to operate than elementary schools, unified 
districts should have higher revenue limits than elementary districts. 
Relative to these complications in the allocation of base revenue, the distribution of 
targeted revenue seems straightforward, in part because much less revenue is involved.  The 
Governor’s Committee would consolidate fourteen current programs into its targeted program.  
The programs are listed in Table A.1 of the Appendix.  In 2004-2005, those programs had 
average revenue of $304 per ADA.  The largest two were the Targeted Instructional 
Improvement Block Grant and Economic Impact Aid, which together constituted 73 percent of 
the total.  Revenue per ADA in the fourteen programs was clearly related to the percentage of 
low-income students in a district.  Figure 5 shows the relationship between targeted revenue 
per ADA and the percentage of students in a district living in families below the federal poverty 
threshold.  The points in the diagram represent the values of both variables for large unified 
                                                     
16 Large elementary districts have more than 100 ADA, large high school districts more than 300 ADA 
and large unified districts more than 1,500 ADA. 
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 districts in 2004-2005.  Note that three districts had targeted revenue exceeding $1,000 per ADA.  
In each case, the explanation is the Targeted Instructional Improvement Block Grant program, a 
program that grew out of court-ordered and voluntary desegregation plans.  In 2004-2005, San 
Jose Unified received $1,089 per ADA from this program, raising its total targeted revenue to 
$1,297.  San Francisco Unified and Los Angeles Unified also received large grants from this 
program, $806 and $723 per ADA, respectively.   
Figure 5 
Targeted Revenue per ADA and the Percent of Low-Income Students 
Large Unified Districts (10,000 ADA or more), 2004-2005 
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Despite these outliers, there is a clear positive relationship between targeted revenue per 
ADA and the percent of low-income students.  The bold line in the figure is the average 
relationship between these variables.17  The height of the line is the average revenue per ADA 
for districts with similar percentages of low-income students.  When the percent of low-income 
students is zero, the average is $35, the intercept of that relationship.  Each percentage point 
increase in low-income students increases the average by $11.07, the slope of that relationship.  
If 40 percent of students are low-income, the average is $478 ($35 + 40 x $11.07).  Table 4 shows 
the intercepts and slopes of this relationship for other types of districts.  For each type, revenue 
per ADA is positively related to the percent of low-income students. 
                                                     
17 By average relationship, we mean the ordinary least squares regression of targeted revenue per ADA 
on the percent of low-income students. 
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Table 4 
Average Relationship Between Targeted Revenue per ADA and 
Percentage of Low-Income Students, 2004-2005 
Elementary districts
   Small (0 - 250 ADA) 157 3.47 14 32
   Medium (250 - 1,500 ADA) -23 10.29 24 51
   Large (1,500 ADA +) 33 7.26 34 62
High school districts
   Small (0-1,500 ADA) 160 2.54 19 48
   Medium (1,500 - 6,000 ADA) -22 13.19 30 63
   Large (6,000 ADA +) 75 12.10 41 66
Unified districts
   Small (0 - 3,000 ADA) 58 8.66 24 46
   Medium (3,000 - 10,000 ADA) 42 7.64 34 72
   Large (10,000 ADA +) 35 11.07 26 63
Percent of Districts 
Within $50 of 
Average Relationship
Percent of Districts 
Within $100 of 
Average RelationshipIntercept Slope
 
*Intercepts are negative in two cases because the line best representing the average relationship is zero for 
a value of the percentage of low-income students that is greater than zero.  However, no district in either 
group had a percentage of low-income students below this value. 
 
Parameters 
Because the Governor’s Committee is not specific about every detail of its proposal, we 
must make certain assumptions to simulate it.  This section describes those assumptions and the 
rationale behind each.  In making assumptions, we attempted to be consistent with the 
Committee’s expressed intent.  We recognize, however, that there may be more than one 
interpretation of that intent.  Consequently, we regard our simulations to be illustrative, not 
definitive. 
Our simulations compare the revenue that districts would have received under the 
funding formula proposed by the Governor’s Committee with the revenue districts received in 
2004-2005 from the programs that Committee would consolidate into its base and targeted 
programs.  In most cases, our comparisons employ a hold harmless condition, as recommended 
by the Governor’s Committee in its technical report.  By that condition, we mean that no district 
receives less money in either the GCEE base or targeted program that it received in 2004-2005 in 
the programs that would be consolidated into the two new programs.   
For both the base and targeted programs, the Governor’s Committee would allocate 
revenue across districts in proportion to student counts.  In determining those counts, however, 
it would weight certain students differently.  For the base program, it would weight students by 
grade level.  Though the Committee is not explicit about what grade-level weights should be, it 
suggests that the weights in the current charter school model might be a good guide.  
19 
 Accordingly, we have used those weights in simulating the Committee’s proposals.  The 
weights are summarized in Column 4 of Table 1.  Students in grades 4 through 6 receive a 
weight of unity.  For grades 7 and 8, the weight is 1.03.  For grades K-3, the weight is 1.18, and 
for high school, the weight is 1.20. 
The Committee is very explicit about the weights for low-income students and English 
learners.  For each low-income student, a district would receive additional funds equal to 40 
percent of base funding.  The Committee would use the federal poverty guidelines, not 
eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch, as a definition of poverty.  For each student classified 
as an English learner for three years or less, a district would receive additional funding equal to 
20 percent of base funding.  This percentage would be less for students classified as English 
learners for longer than three years; but, because we do not have data on the length of time 
students are classified as English learners, our simulations assign all English learners a weight 
of 20 percent.   
The Committee does not clearly specify whether the additional revenue for low-income 
students and English learners should be percentages of each district’s base revenue or 
percentages of a statewide average for base revenue.  If the former option were followed, the 
additional revenue a district would receive for disadvantaged students would depend on the 
distribution of its students by grade level.  Because of the grade-level weights in the base 
funding formula, a district with a relatively high percentage of high school students would have 
relatively high base revenue per ADA and thus relatively large targeted revenue for each 
disadvantaged student.  For simplicity, we have chosen the second approach.   In determining 
the targeted revenue for each district, we apply the percentages for low-income students and 
English learners to the statewide average for base funding per ADA.  In calculating that 
average, we do not impose a hold harmless condition.   
These assumptions leave just one parameter to determine, the level of base funding.  We 
parameterize that level by the base funding per pupil for students in grades 4 through 6, a rate 
we refer to as the grade 4-6 base rate.  This grade level receives the lowest weight in the GCEE 
base funding proposal, a weight we have normalized to unity.  Base funding levels for all other 
grades are determined by multiplying the grade weights in Column 4 of Table 1 by this grade 4-
6 base rate.  These funding levels and the distribution of students by grade level determine the 
statewide average for base funding and thus the targeted revenue for low-income students and 
English learners.   
The Committee does not specify the level of base funding, but it does estimate the 
additional cost of its proposal to be $5 billion for 2007-2008.18  Corrected for inflation between 
2004-2005 and 2007-2008, this additional cost is approximately $4.54 billion for 2004-2005, the 
fiscal year for our simulation model.  With some experimentation, we determined that a grade 
4-6 base rate of $5,530 yields an additional cost of $4.5 billion, assuming districts are held 
harmless with respect to both base and targeted revenue.  Accordingly, we have simulated the 
GCEE proposal with that rate.  To show the sensitivity of our results with respect to that choice, 
we have also simulated the proposal with grade 4-6 base rates of $5,000 and $6,000.  
                                                     
18 In the analysis that follows, base funding refers to the consolidated general purpose funding that each 
districts would receive under the GCEE proposal. 
20 
 Table 5 gives the rate of targeted revenue per disadvantaged student for each of the 
three grade 4-6 base rates we employ in our simulations.  For example, when the grade 4-6 base 
rate is $5,530 per ADA, the statewide average for base funding (without the hold harmless 
condition) is $6,189.  Forty percent of that average is $2,476, which is the targeted revenue 
districts receive for every low-income student.  Similarly, 20 percent of that average is $1,238, 
which is the targeted revenue districts receive for every English learners. 
Table 5 
Funding Rates for GCEE Targeted Program 
Grade 4-6 Base
Rate ($/ADA)
5,000 5,596 2,238 1,119
5,530 6,189 2,476 1,238
6,000 6,715 2,686 1,343
Statewide Base
Funding ($/ADA) Low-income English Learners
Targeted Rates ($/student)
 
 
Results 
These assumptions and parameter values make it relatively straightforward to simulate 
the GCEE proposal.  With districts held harmless and a grade 4-6 rate of $5,530 per ADA, the 
GCEE base and targeted programs would have required $40,694 million, a $4,495 million 
increase over the revenue allocated in 2004-2005 through the programs consolidated into the 
new base and targeted programs (Table 6).  The revenue required for the base program would 
be $1,697 million more than the revenue of programs consolidated into the new base program.  
The new targeted program would require $2,798 million more than was allocated through 
targeted programs in 2004-2005.  Thus, roughly 60 percent of the additional revenue required 
by the GCEE proposal would be allocated to the new targeted program.  In contrast, of the $36 
billion in revenue in all the programs that the Governor’s Committee would consolidate, only 5 
percent of the total was allocated through targeted programs. 
Table 6 
Additional Revenue with GCEE Funding Formula 
Grade 4-6 Base
Rate ($/ADA)
5,000 -2,091 2,327 236 9 2,374 2,384
5,530 1,338 2,759 4,098 1,697 2,798 4,495
6,000 4,380 3,143 7,523 4,601 3,175 7,776
Districts Held Harmless
Base Targeted Total Base Targeted Total
Districts Not Held Harmless
($ M) ($ M)($ M) ($ M) ($ M) ($ M)
 
 
If districts were not held harmless, the additional cost of the GCEE program would be 
$4,098 million, a reduction of $397 million from the cost when districts are held harmless.  The 
bulk of this reduction would come through the base program.  Without the hold harmless 
condition, the base program would cost an additional $1,338 million.  With the condition, the 
cost rises to $1,697, an increase of $359 million.  In contrast, the cost of the hold harmless 
condition for the targeted program is only $39 million.  Almost all districts would receive more 
money from the GCEE targeted program than they now receive from the programs 
consolidated into that new program.   
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 Higher grade 4-6 base rates increase the total revenue, of course, but also change the 
distribution of new revenue between the targeted and base programs.  For a grade 4-6 base rate 
of $5,530, 62 percent of additional revenue is allocated through the targeted program.  For a rate 
of $6,000, this proportion falls to 41 percent. 
As the grade 4-6 base rate increases, the cost of the hold harmless condition decreases.  
For the grade 4-6 base rate of $5,000, the additional revenue required because of the hold 
harmless condition is $2,148 million ($2,384 million minus $236 million).  For a grade 4-6 base 
rate of $5,530, that cost falls to only $397 million.  For a rate of $6,000, it is just $253 million.   
At higher grade 4-6 rates, the hold harmless condition is not particularly expensive 
because the districts that would be held harmless are small.  While their revenue per ADA may 
exceed the GCEE funding formula, that difference multiplied by ADA is still small.  Figure 6 
illustrates this reality.  The points in the figure show the percent of low-income students in each 
unified district and the revenue per ADA those districts would receive under the GCEE funding 
formula with the hold harmless condition and a grade 4-6 rate of $5,530.  The vast majority of 
districts are clustered in a band that begins at about $6,200 per ADA for districts with few low-
income students and extends to $8,000 per ADA when about 40 percent of students are low-
income.  All but one of the districts that lie significantly above this band have fewer than 3,000 
ADA.19  If the hold harmless condition were not applied, the revenue of these districts would be 
substantially reduced, moving them down to the lower band of districts.  However, because the 
districts that would experience reductions are small, relatively little revenue would be saved by 
this action.  Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix are equivalent diagrams for elementary and 
high school districts.  The figures reveal the same general conclusion:  Districts that benefit 
substantially from the hold harmless condition are small. 
The saving from relaxing the hold harmless condition would be further reduced by two 
recommendations of the Governor’s Committee.  First, the Committee would continue the 
practice of allowing districts to keep property tax revenue in excess of their base revenue.  
Second, it would continue the provisions for necessary small schools “until a suitable 
alternative approach is developed” (Technical Report, pages 5-17).  Many of the small districts 
depicted in Figure 6 have excess taxes and necessary small schools, and thus relaxing the hold 
harmless condition would not substantially reduce their revenue. 
 
                                                     
19 The exception is Palo Alto Unified with ADA of 9,693, revenue per pupil of $9,020, and 5 percent low-
income students.  Palo Alto Unified had excess taxes in 2004-2005. 
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Figure 6 
Revenue per ADA with GCEE Funding Formula 
Unified Districts* 
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*One district had revenue exceeding $20,000 per ADA and is not shown 
above.  It had an ADA of 20. 
 
Because the GCEE proposal would focus considerably more revenue than the current 
system on disadvantaged students, the districts serving high percentages of such students 
experience the largest gains under the GCEE proposal.  Table 7 shows the distribution of gains 
with a grade 4-6 base rate of $5,530 per ADA.  The table partitions districts into 27 different 
groups based on type, size, and percent of low-income students.  The numbers in parentheses in 
each cell of the table indicate the number of districts in that cell.  For example, the upper-left cell 
consists of small elementary districts with 10 percent or fewer low-income students.  Fifty-nine 
districts fit that description, and the average gain for these districts was $228 per ADA.  For 
each district type and size, the average gain increases as the percent of low-income students 
increases.  For large unified districts, districts that enrolled nearly 60 percent of students in 
2004-2005, the average gain increases from $698 per ADA for the districts with less than 10 
percent low-income students to $1,071 per ADA for districts with more than 20 percent of low-
income students.   
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Table 7 
Average Increase in Revenue with Grade 4-6 Base Rate of $5,530 per ADA, 
2004-2005 Dollars per ADA (Number of Districts in Parentheses)* 
Elementary Districts
Small (0 - 250 ADA) 228 (59) 324 (52) 781 (86)
Medium (250 - 1,500 ADA) 322 (66) 487 (49) 1,163 (65)
Large (1,500 ADA + ) 509 (73) 851 (42) 1,249 (65)
High School Districts
Small (0 - 1,500 ADA) 180 (5) 355 (14) 797 (8)
Medium (1,500 - 6,000 ADA) 323 (11) 542 (10) 921 (6)
Large (6,000 ADA + ) 362 (12) 700 (12) 637 (5)
Unified Districts
Small (0 - 3,000 ADA) 406 (26) 472 (45) 868 (52)
Medium (3,000 - 10,000 ADA) 595 (48) 759 (32) 1,215 (24)
Large (10,000 ADA + ) 698 (32) 906 (50) 1,071 (25)
0 - 10 10 - 20 20 or more
Percent of Low-income Students
 
*The hold harmless condition was applied in simulating revenue increases. 
 
The one exception to this trend is for large high school districts.  The gain for districts 
with 10 to 20 percent low-income students is greater than the gain for districts with 20 percent 
or more of such students.  The explanation for this exception is twofold.  First, on average, the 
five districts with more than 20 percent low-income students have higher base revenue under 
the current system than the twelve districts with 10 to 20 percent low-income students.  
Accordingly, the average increase in base revenue for the high poverty districts is less than the 
average for the other districts.  On average, the difference is $130 per student.  Second, although 
the high poverty districts receive a bigger increase in targeted revenue than the other districts, 
the difference is not large.  On average, the difference in the increase is only $67 per student.  
Thus, on net, the average gain for high poverty districts is $63 per student less ($130−$67) than 
for districts with 10 to 20 percent low-income students.   
In addition to the positive relationship between poverty and the increase in revenue, 
Table 7 reveals another significant trend:  High school districts tend to gain less than either 
elementary or unified districts.  For example, large high school districts in which low-income 
students represent 10 to 20 percent of the student population would gain an average of $700 per 
ADA.  In comparison, large elementary and unified districts with 10 to 20 percent of such 
students would gain $851 and $906 per ADA, respectively.  In general, this result is due to the 
distribution of revenue under the 2004-2005 baseline.  High school districts tended to have 
higher base revenue than other districts.  The GCEE formula does weight high school students 
more heavily than other students, but the difference between what high school districts would 
receive and what they did receive is still smaller than for other districts.  The web document 
“Governor’s Committee on Education Excellence:  Simulation Results” has base and targeted 
revenue for every school district. 
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 These general patterns hold for other values of the grade 4-6 base rate (Tables A.2 and 
A.3 in the Appendix).  The GCEE proposal would direct relatively more revenue to districts 
with high proportions of low-income students, to large districts, and to unified and elementary 
districts.  These patterns reflect not only the priorities of the Committee, particularly its 
emphasis on providing more resources to disadvantaged students, but also the implicit 
priorities of the current system.  Considering the large differences in achievement between 
disadvantaged students and other students, California’s current distribution of revenue among 
districts appears to place little emphasis on providing more resources to districts with many 
disadvantaged students.  Also, the current system provides more revenue per pupil to high 
school districts than to elementary and unified districts.  The GCEE proposal weights high 
school students more heavily than other students, but this weight applies not only to high 
school districts but also to unified districts.  Lastly, under the current system, small school 
districts receive more revenue per pupil than large districts.  The GCEE proposal would 
continue this practice, but it would not allocate additional revenue to those schools.   
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 Conclusion 
The report of the Governor’s Committee concerns more than school finance.  The 
Committee makes important recommendations with regard to teachers, school leaders, state 
and local governance, and a substantial new investment in preschool.  In our view, however, 
none of these recommendations is as fundamental as the Committee’s proposed reform of 
school finance.  The reality is that California currently allocates more than $40 billion of tax 
revenue (more than $1,000 per resident) through a system that few understand.  Good schools 
require much more than a sound finance system, but that system is also about more than 
schools.  When the government levies taxes, it has an obligation to use the proceeds rationally 
and transparently.  California’s school finance system fails those tests. 
From that perspective, the Committee’s finance proposal is a step in the right direction.  
By consolidating a large number of revenue programs into two programs with simple formulas 
for allocating revenue, it makes the school finance system much more transparent.  It also 
makes the system more rational:  Districts with similar students receive similar revenue; 
districts in which students have greater need receive more revenue.  The proposal also brings 
the school finance system in line with the state’s expectations for academic achievement.  
Schools throughout the state are expected to meet the same high academic standards regardless 
of the backgrounds of their students, yet student background has a very significant effect on 
academic achievement.  Accordingly, schools with many disadvantaged students should have 
significantly more resources than other schools.  The current system does not systematically 
produce this outcome; the proposed system would. 
 The proposal of the Governor’s Committee is also remarkably similar to a proposal by 
Alan Bersin, Michael Kirst, and Goodwin Liu.  It is heartening that two groups of experienced, 
knowledgeable, and respected individuals arrived independently in much the same place.  This 
agreement suggests that there may be wide consensus about the direction reform should take.  
That is not to suggest that there will be no difficult policy choices in implementing that 
direction.  In fact, those difficulties are illustrated by the four main differences in the two 
proposals that we have noted above.   
In addition to those policy choices, subsequent reform proposals should address the 
special problems of small school districts in sparsely populated areas.  On average, these 
districts currently receive more funding than would be provided by the GCEE funding 
formulas.  The Governor’s Committee recognizes the legitimate needs of these districts and 
recommends that the state continue its revenue provisions for necessary small schools.  
Alternatively, the state might use the occasion of a general reform of its school finance system to 
reconsider these provisions.  An approach used by other states is to include a measure of 
population density in the state’s funding formula.  That approach might also be sensible for 
California.   
These policy choices will be easier if a consensus emerges about the direction of reform, 
a possibility suggested by the similarities in the two reform proposals.  However, the common 
direction identified by the Governor’s Committee and by Bersin, Kirst, and Liu does require the 
state to make two very difficult decisions.  The first decision is to devolve to local school 
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 districts the authority over how revenue is spent.  Both proposals would consolidate many 
revenue programs, most of which have restrictions on how revenue can be used − restrictions 
established by past legislatures.  Would a future legislature be willing to remove those 
restrictions, allowing each local school district to decide how best to spend its funds?  
California’s evolving accountability system provides a ready rationale for the devolution of 
spending authority, but not everyone may find this rationale convincing.  The second decision 
is to place a higher priority on disadvantaged students in allocating revenue, a priority in both 
the proposal of the Governor’s Committee and the proposals by Bersin, Kirst, and Liu.  This 
priority is certainly consistent with the state’s goal of high achievement for all students, but it 
runs directly counter to another significant reality.  California school districts have fewer 
resources than districts in many other states.  As a consequence, all California districts may 
reasonably believe that they are being asked to accomplish great feats with rather modest 
means.20  Can the state place a priority on providing resources to some districts when all 
districts may believe their resources are inadequate?   
 
                                                     
20 For an account of this tension, see Rose et al., High Expectations, Modest Means:  The Challenge Facing 
California’s Public Schools, Public Policy Institute of California, 2003. 
28 
 Appendix 
Table A.1 
2004-2005 Revenue Programs Allocated to Governor’s Committee Funding Model 
 
Dollars
Revenue Program per ADA Subtotals
Revenue sources consolidated into new base program
District Revenue Limit 
Local Revenue (Including ERAF) 1,820.95
State Aid (net of COE transfers) 3,201.00
Local Funded Charter School Gen. Purpose Entitlement 30.85
Charter School In Lieu of Property Taxes
Unified Districts 10.18
Elementary and High School Districts 5.79
Charter School Categorical Block Grant 6110-211-0001 3.16
Basic Aid Supplement Charter School Adjustment 0.08
State Lottery Revenue 157.46
Instructional Materials Block Grant 6110-189-0001 61.93
Instructional Materials - Williams Case 23.55
School Library Materials 6110-149-0001 0.71
State Mandates 24.50
School Improvement 
Kindergarten - Grade 6  6110-116-0001(1) 56.57
Grades 7 - 12 6110-116-0001(2) 11.97
Class Size Reduction
Kindergarten - Grade 3 6110-234-0001 272.86
Grade 9 6110-232-0001 13.96
Tenth Grade Counseling 6110-108-0001 2.04
Supplemental Grants 6110-235-0001 28.79
Year Round Schools 6110-224-0001 14.56
Charter School Facilities Grants 6110-485 0.12
Tobacco Use Prevention Education (Prop 99) 2.84
Environmental Education 0.00
Home to School Transportation 6110-111-0001 
Pupil Transportation sch. (1) 84.12
Small School District Bus Replacement sch. (2) 0.69
School Safety Block Grants 6110-228-0001
Grades 8-12 sch. (1) 14.87
School Community Policing Partnership Comp. Grant sch. (5) 1.50
Budget Act
Number 
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 Dollars
Revenue Program per ADA Subtotals
High Risk Youth Education and Public Safety Program 6110-212-0001 0.03
Staff Development Day Buyout 6110-112-0001 36.15
Math and Reading Professional Development Program 6110-137-0001 5.02
Beginning Teacher Support and Assessment 6110-191-0001 9.15
National Board Certification Incentives 6110-195-0001 1.08
Intersegmental Staff Development 6110-197-0001 0.22
Staff Development - Instructional Support 6110-193-0001
Reader Services for Blind Teachers  sch. (3) 0.05
Teacher Peer Review sch. (2) 4.30
Supplemental Instruction (Summer School) 6110-104-0001 
Grades K-12, Core Academic  sch. (4) 16.21
After School Programs 6110-649 10.05
Early Mental Health Initiative 1.60
Basic Aid Choice/Court Ordered Voluntary Pupil Transfer 0.62
American Indian Early Child Education Program 6110-151-0001(2) 0.09
Gifted and Talented Pupil Program 6110-124-0001 8.32
Specialized Secondary Program Grants 6110-122-0001 0.69
Advanced Placement Programs 6110-240-0001 0.43
Partnership Academy Programs 6110-166-0001 3.56
Schools Apportionment - Apprentice Program 6110-103-0001 2.27
Child Nutrition 6110-203-0001 12.80
Child Nutrition Breakfast Startup 6110-201-0001 0.17
Child Nutrition, Linking Education, Activity, & Food 0.02
Subtotal 5,957.90
Table A.1 continued
Number 
Budget Act
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 Dollars
Revenue Program per ADA Subtotals
Revenue sources consolidated into new targeted program
Targeted Instructional Improvement Block Grant 6110-132-0001 128.02
Economic Impact Aid 6110-128-0001 92.74
Supplemental Instruction (Summer School) 6110-104-0001 
Grades 7-12, CAHSEE sch. (1) 32.97
Grades 2-9, Retained or Recommended for Retention sch. (2) 12.45
Grades 2-6, Low STAR or At Risk sch. (3) 4.80
English Learners Student Assistance 6110-125-0001 9.41
Community-Based English Tutoring Program 6110-617 8.61
Community Day Schools 6110-190-0001 5.52
Dropout Prevention 6110-120-0001 3.78
CalSAFE 6110-198-0001
Child Care sch. (2) 2.62
Academic and Supportive Services sch. (1) 1.98
Healthy Start 6110-200-0001 0.35
Opportunity Classes and Programs 6110-127-0001 0.30
At Risk Youth (LAUSD) 6110-280-0001 0.10
Subtotal 303.63
Budget Act
Table A.1 continued
Number 
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 Dollars
Revenue Program per ADA Subtotals
Revenue sources not consolidated into student-centered funding model
Revenue sources consolidated into new school intervention program
Low Performing Schools/High Priority Schools 6110-123-0001(2) 33.11
Immediate Intervention/Underperforming Schools Program 6110-123-0001(1) 8.99
Corrective Actions 6110-123-0001(3) 0.91
Special Education
Special Education Apportionment 6110-161-0001 462.07
Federal Special Education-Local Assistance 168.63
Special Education Property Taxes 55.22
Special Education Annual Mandate Settlement 4.30
Special Education ROCP Handicapped 0.59
Special Ed DDS Early Intervention Program 0.17
Adult Education 6110-156-0001 105.48
Adults in Correctional Facilities 6110-158-0001 2.32
ROC/Ps 6110-105-0001 71.43
Agricultural Vocational Education 6110-167-0001 0.77
Child Care and Development 6110-196-0001
Preschool Education sch. (1) 27.78
General Child Development Programs sch. (1.5a) 30.00
Extended Day Care  sch. (1.5i) 1.83
Alternative Payment Program Stage 2 sch. (1.5e) 0.48
Alternative Payment Program Stage 3 Setaside sch. (1.5f) 0.34
Alternative Payment Program sch. (1.5d) 0.18
Migrant Day Care sch. (1.5c) 0.12
Resource and Referral sch. (1.5g) 0.07
Deferred Maintenance 6110-189-0001 42.39
Student Assessment Testing 6110-113-0001
STAR Program sch. (3) 1.93
English Lang Development Assessment sch. (4) 1.49
High School Exit Exam sch. (5) 0.35
Foster Youth Program 6110-119-0001 0.27
Subtotal 1,021.25
Number 
Budget Act
Table A.1 continued
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 Table A.2 
Average Increase in Revenue with Grade 4-6 Base Rate of $5,000 per ADA, 
Dollars per ADA (Number of Districts in Parentheses), 2004-2005 
Elementary Districts
Small (0-250 ADA) 153 (59) 254 (52) 665 (86)
Medium (250 -1,500 ADA) 171 (66) 337 (49) 917 (65)
Large (1,500 + ADA) 204 (73) 546 (42) 902 (65)
High School Districts
Small (0-1,500 ADA) 134 (5) 205 (14) 699 (8)
Medium (1,500-6,000 ADA) 123 (11) 301 (10) 597 (6)
Large (6,000 + ADA) 101 (12) 408 (12) 461 (5)
Unified Districts
Small (0-3,000 ADA) 232 (26) 355 (45) 714 (52)
Medium (3,000 -10,000 ADA) 192 (48) 393 (32) 805 (24)
Large (10,000 + ADA) 227 (32) 452 (50) 689 (25)
0 - 10 10 - 20 20 or more
Percent of Low-income Students
 
 
Table A.3 
Average Increase in Revenue with Grade 4-6 Base Rate of $6,000 per ADA, 
Dollars per ADA (Number of Districts in Parentheses), 2004-2005 
Elementary Districts
Small (0-250 ADA) 389 (59) 467 (52) 986 (86)
Medium (250 -1,500 ADA) 686 (66) 909 (49) 1,700 (65)
Large (1,500 + ADA) 992 (73) 1,394 (42) 1,840 (65)
High School Districts
Small (0-1,500 ADA) 348 (5) 685 (14) 1,172 (8)
Medium (1,500-6,000 ADA) 700 (11) 1,139 (10) 1,561 (6)
Large (6,000 + ADA) 846 (12) 1,291 (12) 1,163 (5)
Unified Districts
Small (0-3,000 ADA) 714 (26) 689 (45) 1,172 (52)
Medium (3,000 -10,000 ADA) 1,116 (48) 1,330 (32) 1,837 (24)
Large (10,000 + ADA) 1,246 (32) 1,479 (50) 1,689 (25)
0 - 10 10 - 20 20 or more
Percent of Low-income Students
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 Figure A.1 
Revenue per ADA with GCEE Funding Formula 
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* Seven districts have revenue greater than $20,000 per ADA.  Six had less than 60 
students, and the seventh had 209 students. 
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 Figure A.2 
Revenue per ADA with GCEE Funding Formula 
High School Districts* 
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* One district had revenue greater than $20,000 per ADA.  It had 915 students. 
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